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Trust is an ineffable notion that permeates very many things.
What trust are we going to have in this talk?
Computer idealisation of “trust” to support decision-making in open
networks. No human emotion, nor philosophical/sociological concept.
Gathering prominence in open applications involving safety guarantees
in a wide sense
credential-based trust: e.g., public-key infrastructures,
authentication and resource access control, network security.
reputation-based trust: e.g., social networks, P2P, trust metrics,
probabilistic approaches.
trust models: e.g., security policies, languages, game theory.
trust in information sources: e.g., information ﬁltering and
provenance, content trust, user interaction, social concerns.
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Reputation
behavioural: perception that an agent creates through past
actions about its intentions and norms of behaviour.
social: calculated on the basis of observations made by others.
An agent’s reputation may affect the trust that others have toward it.
Trust
subjective: a level of the subjective expectation an agent has
about another’s future behaviour based on based on the history of
their encounters and of hearsay.
Conﬁdence in the trust assessment is also a parameter of importance.
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E.g.: Reputation-based access control
p’s ‘trust’ in q’s actions at time t, is determined by p’s observations of
q’s behaviour up until time t according to a given policy ψ.
Example
You download what claims to be a new cool browser from some
unknown site. Your trust policy may be:
allow the program to connect to a remote site if and only if it has
neither tried to open a local ﬁle that it has not created, nor to
modify a ﬁle it has created, nor to create a sub-process.
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4 Probabilistic event structures
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Some novel ideas well established by now.
A set P of n peers who interact pairwise and mutually rate the
interaction either sat or unsat.
I Peer i computes a local ‘trust value’ in peer j:
sij = sat(i,j) − unsat(i,j) t 0.
I Peer i then deﬁnes a normalised measure of its local trust in j:
cij =
sij P
j sij
[cij] deﬁnes a Markov chain (i.e.,
P
j cij = 1), with stationary
distribution (tj)j∈P. The global trust value for principal j is tj.
Simulations prove that EigenTrust is a smart system. Yet, no much
is said formally about properties, e.g. safety guarantees and the
incidence of values like tj.
V. Sassone (Soton) Foundations of Computational Trust 06.11.22 7 / 35EigenTrust (Kamvar et al)
Some novel ideas well established by now.
A set P of n peers who interact pairwise and mutually rate the
interaction either sat or unsat.
I Peer i computes a local ‘trust value’ in peer j:
sij = sat(i,j) − unsat(i,j) t 0.
I Peer i then deﬁnes a normalised measure of its local trust in j:
cij =
sij P
j sij
[cij] deﬁnes a Markov chain (i.e.,
P
j cij = 1), with stationary
distribution (tj)j∈P. The global trust value for principal j is tj.
Simulations prove that EigenTrust is a smart system. Yet, no much
is said formally about properties, e.g. safety guarantees and the
incidence of values like tj.
V. Sassone (Soton) Foundations of Computational Trust 06.11.22 7 / 35EigenTrust (Kamvar et al)
Some novel ideas well established by now.
A set P of n peers who interact pairwise and mutually rate the
interaction either sat or unsat.
I Peer i computes a local ‘trust value’ in peer j:
sij = sat(i,j) − unsat(i,j) t 0.
I Peer i then deﬁnes a normalised measure of its local trust in j:
cij =
sij P
j sij
[cij] deﬁnes a Markov chain (i.e.,
P
j cij = 1), with stationary
distribution (tj)j∈P. The global trust value for principal j is tj.
Simulations prove that EigenTrust is a smart system. Yet, no much
is said formally about properties, e.g. safety guarantees and the
incidence of values like tj.
V. Sassone (Soton) Foundations of Computational Trust 06.11.22 7 / 35EigenTrust (Kamvar et al)
Some novel ideas well established by now.
A set P of n peers who interact pairwise and mutually rate the
interaction either sat or unsat.
I Peer i computes a local ‘trust value’ in peer j:
sij = sat(i,j) − unsat(i,j) t 0.
I Peer i then deﬁnes a normalised measure of its local trust in j:
cij =
sij P
j sij
[cij] deﬁnes a Markov chain (i.e.,
P
j cij = 1), with stationary
distribution (tj)j∈P. The global trust value for principal j is tj.
Simulations prove that EigenTrust is a smart system. Yet, no much
is said formally about properties, e.g. safety guarantees and the
incidence of values like tj.
V. Sassone (Soton) Foundations of Computational Trust 06.11.22 7 / 35Simple Probabilistic Systems
The model λθ:
Each principal p behaves in each interaction according to a ﬁxed
and independent probability θp of ‘success’ (and therefore 1 − θp
of ‘failure’).
The framework:
Interface (Trust computation algorithm, A):
I Input: A sequence h = x1x2 ···xn for n ≥ 0 and xi ∈ {s,f}.
I Output: A probability distribution π : {s,f} → [0,1].
Goal:
I Output π approximates (θp,1 − θp) as well as possible, under the
hypothesis that input h is the outcome of interactions with p.
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Trust computation A0
A0(s | h) =
Ns(h)
|h|
A0(f | h) =
Nf(h)
|h|
Nx(h) = “number of x’s in h”
Bayesian analysis inspired by λβ model: f(θ | αβ) ∝ θα−1(1 − θ)β−1
Properties:
Well deﬁned semantics: A0(s | h) is interpreted as a probability of
success in the next interaction.
Solidly based on probability theory and Bayesian analysis.
Formal result: A0(s | h) → θp as |h| → ∞.
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Even more tightly inspired by Bayesian analysis and by λβ
Trust computation A1
A1(s | h) =
Ns(h) + 1
|h| + 2
A1(f | h) =
Nf(h) + 1
|h| + 2
Nx(h) = “number of x’s in h”
Properties:
Well deﬁned semantics: A1(s | h) is interpreted as a probability of
success in the next interaction.
Solidly based on probability theory and Bayesian analysis.
Formal result: Chernoff bound Prob[error ≥ ] ≤ 2e−2m2
, where
m is the number of trials.
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Trust computation A2
Based on λβ, like A1, but with serious approach to reputation. One of
the few systems to also accounts for “malicious” reports.
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Recall the framework
Interface (Trust computation algorithm, A):
I Input: A sequence h = x1x2 ···xn for n ≥ 0 and xi ∈ {s,f}.
I Output: A probability distribution π : {s,f} → [0,1].
Goal:
I Output π approximates (θp,1 − θp) as well as possible, under the
hypothesis that input h is the outcome of interactions with p.
We would like to consolidate in two directions:
1 model comparison
2 complex event model
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An information-theoretic “distance” on distributions
Cross entropy of distributions p,q : {o1,...,om} → [0,1].
D(p || q) =
m X
i=1
p(oi) · log
 
p(oi)/q(oi)

It holds 0 ≤ D(p || q) ≤ ∞, and D(p || q) = 0 iff p = q.
Established measure in statistics for comparing distributions.
Information-theoretic: the average amount of information
discriminating p from q.
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A measure on probabilistic trust algorithms
Goal of a probabilistic trust algorithm A: given a history X,
approximate a distribution on the outcomes O = {o1,...,om}.
Different histories X result in different output distributions A(· | X).
Expected cross entropy from λ to A
EDn(λ || A) =
X
X∈On
Prob(X | λ) · D(Prob(· | Xλ) || A(· | X))
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Consider the beta model λβ and the algorithms A0 of maximum
likelihood (Despotovic et al.) and A1 beta (Mui et al.).
Theorem
If θ = 0 or θ = 1 then A0 computes the exact distribution, whereas A1
does not. That is, for all n > 0 we have:
EDn(λβ || A0) = 0 < EDn(λβ || A1)
If 0 < θ < 1, then EDn(λβ || A0) = ∞, and A1 is always better.
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A parametric algorithm A
A(s | h) =
Ns(h) + 
|h| + 2
, A(f | h) =
Nf(h) + 
|h| + 2
Theorem
For any θ ∈ [0,1], θ 6= 1/2 there exists ¯  ∈ [0,∞) that minimises
EDn(λβ || A), simultaneously for all n.
Furthermore, EDn(λβ || A) is a decreasing function of  on the interval
(0,¯ ), and increasing on (¯ ,∞).
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EDn(λβ || A), simultaneously for all n.
Furthermore, EDn(λβ || A) is a decreasing function of  on the interval
(0,¯ ), and increasing on (¯ ,∞).
That is, unless behaviour is completely unbiased, there exists a unique
best A algorithm that for all n outperforms all the others.
If θ = 1/2, the larger the , the better.
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A(s | h) =
Ns(h) + 
|h| + 2
, A(f | h) =
Nf(h) + 
|h| + 2
Theorem
For any θ ∈ [0,1], θ 6= 1/2 there exists ¯  ∈ [0,∞) that minimises
EDn(λβ || A), simultaneously for all n.
Furthermore, EDn(λβ || A) is a decreasing function of  on the interval
(0,¯ ), and increasing on (¯ ,∞).
Algorithm A0 is optimal for θ = 0 and for θ = 1.
Algorithm A1 is optimal for θ = 1
2 ± 1 √
12.
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Move from O = {s,f} to complex outcomes
Interactions and protocols
At an abstract level, entities in a distributed system interact
according to protocols;
Information about an external entity is just information about (the
outcome of) a number of (past) protocol runs with that entity.
Events as model of information
A protocol can be speciﬁed as a concurrent process, at different
levels of abstractions.
Event structures were invented to give formal semantics to truely
concurrent processes, expressing “causation” and “conﬂict.”
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Immediate conﬂict #µ: e # e0 and there is x that enables both.
Confusion free: #µ is transitive and e #µ e0 implies [e) = [e0).
Cell: maximal c ⊆ E such that e,e0 ∈ c implies e #µ e0.
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How to assign valuations to cells? They are the model’s unknowns.
Theorem (Bayes)
Prob[Θ | Xλ] ∝ Prob[X | Θλ] · Prob[Θ | λ]
A second-order notion: we not are interested in X or its probability, but
in the expected value of Θ! So, we will:
start with a prior hypothesis Θ; this will be a cell valuation;
record the events X as they happen during the interactions;
compute the posterior; this is a new model ﬁtting better with the
evidence and allowing us better predictions (in a precise sense).
But: the posteriors need to be (interpretable as) a cell valuations.
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Let c1,...,cM be the set of cells of E, with ci = {ei
1,...,ei
Ki}.
A cell valuation assigns a distribution Θci to each ci, the same way
as an eventless model assigns a distribution θ to {s,f}.
The occurrence of an x from {s,f} is a random process with two
outcomes, a binomial (Bernoulli) trial on θ.
The occurrence of an event from cell ci is a random process with
Ki outcomes. That is, a multinomial trial on Θci.
To exploit this analogy we only need to lift the λβ model to a model
based on multinomial experiments.
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The Dirichlet family D(Θ | α) ∝
Q
Θ
α1−1
1 ···Θ
αK−1
K
Theorem
The Dirichlet family is a conjugate prior for multinomial trials. That is, if
Prob[Θ | λ] is D(Θ | α1,...,αK) and
Prob[X | Θλ] follows the law of multinomial trials Θ
n1
1 ···Θ
nK
K ,
then Prob[Θ | Xλ] is D(Θ | α1 + n1,...,αK + nK) according to Bayes.
So, we start with a family D(Θci | αci), and then use multinomial trials
X : E → ω to keep updating the valuation as D(Θci | αci + Xci).
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As a result, we have lifted the trust computational algorithms based on
λβ to our event-base models by replacing
Binomials (Bernoulli) trials 7→ multinomial trials;
β-distribution 7→ Dirichlet distribution.
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Hidden Markov Models
Probability parameters can change as the internal state change,
probabilistically. HMM is λ = (A,B,π), where
A is a Markov chain, describing state transitions;
B is family of distributions Bs : O → [0,1];
π is the initial state distribution.
1
.01
++ 2
.25
kk
π1 = 1
B1(a) = .95
B1(b) = .05
O = {a,b}
π2 = 0
B2(a) = .05
B2(b) = .95
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Bayesian analysis:
What models best explain (and thus predict) observations?
How to approximate a HMM from a sequence of observations?
History h = a10b2. A counting algorithm would then assign high
probability to a occurring next. But he last two b’s suggest a state
change might have occurred, which would in reality make that
probability very low.
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A framework for “trust and reputation systems”
I applications to security and history-based access control.
Basic policies can be speciﬁed declaratively and veriﬁed
efﬁciently. Quantiﬁed policies are expressive, and quantiﬁed
model checking is decidable (though hard with many quantiﬁers).
Bayesian approach to observations and approximations, formal
results based on probability theory. Towards model comparison
and complex-outcomes Bayesian model.
Future work
I Probabilistic logic.
I Dynamic models with variable structure.
I Better integration of reputation in the model.
I Relationships with game-theoretic models.
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